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These days it has been witnessed, that banks o⁄er individual loans instead of
group loans and develop products based on individual liability in developing coun-
tries. In order to study this surprising turn, we expand the conventional approach
on decision making of individuals. A social prestige function is introduced that re-
￿ ects the non-monetary impacts of group membership on the individual and on her
decisions. If a borrower possesses more than a critical level of wealth, it is optimal
for her to switch to individual borrowing. From a welfare perspective, a mixture
of individual and group loans is desirable. However, the average borrower switches
from group to individual lending too soon.
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11 Introduction
Group lending is said to be the key factor in micro￿nance by mitigating information
problems and therewith increasing repayment rates. In recent years, however, individual
loans have also be given to poor people in developing countries. But which type of loan
would be the best for the borrower? And which model of lending would maximize the
economy￿ s welfare? The purpose of this article is to provide a theory which answers these
open questions.
In general, micro￿nance has been considered to be a major innovation to allow the
poor to work their way out of poverty. With the help of small group loans that do
not require collateral, the poor are able to start their own businesses. Prof. Mohammad
Yunus, awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2006, founded the Grameen Bank in 1983 (Yunus,
1999). The bank lends small amounts of money to groups usually made of ￿ve poor people.
The borrowers monitor each other and are liable for the repayment of the whole loan on
time. In 1997, a conglomeration of 2,900 people from 137 countries, the Microcredit
Summit, raised 2 billion US$ (Morduch, 1999, p. 1571) to provide microcredits to 100
million families worldwide within 9 years. In 2006, the campaign was renewed until
2015 with the objectives to give 175 million US$ of ￿...loan for self-employment and
other ￿nancial and business services...￿to the poorest families and ￿...ensure that 100
million families rise above the US$1 threshold adjusted for purchasing power parity...￿
(www.microcreditsummit.org). This proves strong and broad support for the idea of
micro￿nance. However one can ask, whether this super hype is justi￿ed.
The majority of economists, including Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990), Banerjee et al.
(1994), Besley and Coate (1995), ArmandÆriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000), (2005),
ArmandÆriz de Aghion and Gollier (2000), La⁄ont and Rey (2003), and Khandker (2005)
believe in group lending in micro￿nance. They show theoretically that group lending is
the key to the success of these programs by mitigating information asymmetries. See
Ghatak and Guinanne (1999) for a survey. Once the ￿rst wave of enthusiasm had settled,
the subject of microcredit, in particular group lending, was rarely discussed. It seems that
once the concept of group loans had been understood, economists were not too critical
when it came to group lending.
The ￿rst step in a more critical direction was made by Rai and Sj￿str￿m (2004). In
their paper they show theoretically that, within their speci￿c framework, repayments for
other borrowers are e¢ cient even if the borrowers are not contractually obliged to do so.
Madajewicz (2004), Conning (2005), Karlan (2007), Gine and Karlan (2007), and Dichter
and Harper (2007) also suggest that individual loans might be better suited to provide
poor entrepreneurs with a way out of poverty. This perspective was most clearly spelled
out by Bateman (2010) who claims ￿... that the role of micro￿nance in development
policy urgently needs to be reconstructed￿ .
Looking at the market, the picture has changed. Banks like ASA in Bangladesh or
BancoSol in Bolivia o⁄er individual loans in addition to group loans. Also Grameen bank
developed the Grameen II scheme (GinØ and Karlan, 2008) which also contains individual
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(2006) suggest that in the future there will be no sustainable micro￿nance institution
(MFI) that does not provide individual loans.
In our paper, we take a critical look at the past when group loans were the only type of
credit in the market. We provide a model which shows that individual and group lending
in the market can perform better. One might wonder whether there has been too much
group lending in micro￿nance?
We model a loan market where individual and group loans exists side-by-side1. We
assume that the individual loans are given without collateral or additional monitoring.
We ￿nd support for this in Gine and Karlan (2007). In our model, we assume there to be
risk-averse entrepreneurs, banks and insurer. The entrepreneur would like to invest in a
project. Here we assume that there are two projects, one safe and one risky. The expected
return from the safe project is smaller than the expected return from the risky project.
Furthermore, the entrepreneur can invest individually or as a part of a credit group.
She therefore has three possible types of investment, (a) invest in a safe project as an
individual, (b) invest in a risky project as an individual or (c) invest in a risky project as
part of a credit group.2 Similar to group loans, individual loan is given without requiring
collateral. When compared to individual loans, group loans have three di⁄erentiating
features. First of all, an entrepreneur has to pay a fee in order to be able to join the
group. Secondly she will receive a return payment if her project fails. The third and ￿nal
feature is a social prestige function.
In the literature, social environments, social pressure, and social bene￿t are increas-
ingly considered as very important inputs into the decision-making process of an individual
in a narrow environment as seen in developing countries (Mullainathan, 2004). As Rai
and Sj￿str￿m (2004) mention, some entrepreneurs are reluctant to waste time and e⁄ort
in weekly group meetings and monitoring the other entrepreneurs instead of using these
resources for their own project. Harper (2007) goes further. In addition the ￿wasting
time￿argument, he argues that borrowers in groups have to carry a higher risk than in-
dividuals as they are liable for the other members of their group. And not to forget that
members of a group lose a large part of their privacy. Harper (2007) also recognizes that,
for a lot of people, there is no other way to enter the credit market. However, he says that
the manner in which micro￿nance institutions provide this option is unsatisfactory just
like ￿...shared toilets, primary school classes of 60 children, or clinics without doctors.￿
Micro￿nance institutions seem to o⁄er a ￿second rate service￿to the poor (Harper, 2007,
p.36). Khandker (2005) shows that if certain people are lazier than others, they could be
excluded from a group and thereby from the entering the credit market and other social
events in the community.
1A similar idea is presented in Madajewicz (2004). Our basic structure is di⁄erent, we undertake a
general equilibrium analysis and study e¢ ciency.
2The fourth possible option to invest in a safe project as a part of a credit group is not optimal as
there is no risk in the safe project due to the fact joining a credit group is not without cost. We therefore
rule out this kind of investment.
2As an extension to the existing literature, we capture these circumstances using a
social prestige function which implies an externality. The externality is de￿ned as the
average e⁄ort of all entrepreneurs in groups. The social prestige function now makes a
comparison of the individual e⁄ort to the average e⁄ort of an individual in a group. A
less than the average working entrepreneur will be punished and vice versa, if we consider
a negative externality. We look at a model without an externality as a benchmark and
compare it to the model with a negative externality to get closer insights in the social
impacts of group membership.
Finally we compare expected utilities for both investments. We thereby calculate the
threshold of wealth at which a change in credit types, i.e. from group lending to individual
lending, becomes utility maximizing. Furthermore, we compare whether a switch at this
threshold is welfare maximizing or not.
In the model without an externality, we ￿nd that group lending should be avoided.
The decentralized solution is optimal. The level of wealth to switch is identical in both
allocations. If the externality is negative, we ￿nd that there is too much group lending
in micro￿nance. A borrower should leave the group if she exceeds a speci￿c threshold
of wealth and borrow individually in order to maximize her expected utility. While the
externality becomes stronger, i.e. more negative, the threshold to switch increases. This
means that in a more competitive and narrow environment, the optimal point to switch
credit types takes place at a higher threshold of wealth than in a less competitive and
narrow environment. In terms of welfare, we ￿nd that borrowers leave groups too soon.
Borrowers invest too much e⁄ort into a group loan compared to the optimal allocation.
Here we ￿nd a sample for the ￿rat-race￿equilibrium ￿rst described by Akerlof (1976) and
veri￿ed by Landers et al. (1996). The stronger the externality appears, the stronger this
phenomenon becomes, i.e. the narrower the social community seems to be.
With this new perspective of group lending, we provide an initial theoretical explana-
tion why group lending is gradually being replaced by individual lending in micro￿nance.
We suggest that development policy should support individual lending over group lending
in order to increase borrower￿ s expected utility and the welfare of the economy as a whole.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: In section 2, we show the model and
the optimality conditions. In section 3, the analytical solution for the equilibrium is
considered. The numerical solution is given in section 4 and the results are described in
section 5. In section 6 we o⁄er some concluding comments.
2 Model and optimality conditions
2.1 Setup
We assume a large number of risk-averse entrepreneurs i where i = 1;:::;ng;:::N. Every
entrepreneur owns an individual level of wealth in the beginning which we denote by
w where w = 0;:::; e w;:::;W. Wealth is normally distribute. Banks, which lend capital,
and insurers, which handle the insurance mechanism, are other actors in our model. We
3will explain the meaning of these actors below. We consider a one-period model. The
entrepreneur invests capital k and e⁄ort e in the morning and consumes the complete pro￿t
in the evening. We assume two projects, one safe and one risky, with a higher expected
return from the risky project compared to the safe return, i.e. E (r) > s. Investment in
the risky project is limited to the amount k, investment in the safe project is unlimited.
We consider three options for investment. In case (a), the individual borrower invests
in a safe project. As long as investment in the safe project is unlimited and not related
to any kind of uncertainty, the loan will de￿nitely be repaid. The second option is (b) to
have an individual loan and invest in the risky project. In this case, the amount invested
in the project can be decreased by the individual wealth w of the entrepreneur. The
amount invested in the project is given by k ￿ w where 0 ￿ w < k. Finally, we have
(c) a group loan and investment in the risky project. Here we have two features that
di⁄er from the individual loan in case (b). To make use of a group loan, the entrepreneur
has to pay a fee f. This fee will be used to provide an insurance payment at the end of
the period to any borrower in a group who fails. The second feature is a social prestige
function. This function covers the social status of an individual within her group. An
entrepreneur values a high social prestige. The amount invested in the risky project can
be decreased by individual wealth w in the group case as well. Thus, the amount of credit
is given by k + f ￿ w where 0 ￿ w < k. As the ￿rst case (a) is obvious, we concentrate
our consideration on the latter cases (b) and (c), i.e. investments in risky projects.
Looking more closely at case (b), we have an individual investment in a risky project.
The entrepreneur invests the amount k ￿ w, which is borrowed from a bank. The bank
demands the interest rate 1+r for the loan. In our model, every entrepreneur has her own
individual probability of success, which is dependent on her individual level of invested
e⁄ort. The probability of success p(e(w)) is assumed to be a concave function between
zero and one, characterized by p(0) = 0;p(1) = 1;p0 (e(w)) > 0 and p00 (e(w)) < 0. At
the end of the period there could be two di⁄erent outcomes. With probability p(e(w)),
the project succeeds and the entrepreneur can obtain the outcome y. She will use this
outcome to repay her loan including the interest to the bank. The remaining amount will
be used for consumption. In failure, with probability 1￿p(e(w)), the entrepreneur is faced
with an outcome of zero. She would not be able to repay the loan and cannot consume
anything. In both cases the e⁄ort the entrepreneur invests into the project reduces the
expected utility by ￿e(w). Utility given consumption c and costs of e⁄ort ￿ is u = v (c;￿).
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I ￿ y ￿ (1 + r)(k ￿ w). (2)
Case (c) describes an entrepreneur that invests in a risky project and is a member of a
credit group. We assume that every entrepreneur receives a loan for an individual project
4in a credit group as well. Thus, she invests in her own risky project and is independent
from the other members when it comes to the investment decision. The ￿rst di⁄erence
from individual lending is a payment of f in order to be allowed to join the group. But
why should she do so? With this payment and membership in a group, the entrepreneur is
insured if the project fails. Let us consider the investment by the entrepreneur in a group
and the related expected utility. At the beginning of the period, the entrepreneur borrows
the amount k+f ￿w from a bank and invests the capital k￿w in the risky project. The
fee f will be paid to the insurer. At the end of the period, with probability p(e(w));
the entrepreneur obtains outcome y. She will repay her loan including the interest and
consume the rest. If the project fails, with probability 1 ￿ p(e(w)), the outcome is zero.
However, now that she is in a group, she will receive an insurance payment ￿(e(w)) which
will be provided by the insurer. The utility from the payment if she fails will always be
smaller than the utility of the outcome if she succeeds. Otherwise there would be no
incentive for the entrepreneur to invest e⁄ort into the project.
There is a second feature that di⁄er an individual loan from a group loan; the social
prestige function. Members of groups value their social prestige within this group or within
their social community. The social prestige function is given by q = q (e(w);e(w)
￿). This
function is a combination of the e⁄ort that an entrepreneur invests and the integral of
the e⁄ort of all other entrepreneurs in groups. We treat the latter input factor as an
externality. Thus, the externality e(w)







where ￿ ￿ 0. We have to make some general assumptions for the social prestige function
that should be ful￿lled. So every function that follows the assumptions produces the
same results in our model. We will provide a sample for such a function in the numerical





The more e⁄ort the entrepreneur invests into the project, the more her prestige rises. If
we look at q in terms of e(w)






If all the other entrepreneurs in the group invest a high level of e⁄ort into their projects,
the high level of e⁄ort made by the observed entrepreneur does not produce a high social
prestige in the social community. The high level of e⁄ort is something that is expected
from the entrepreneur within her social community. On the other hand, if all the other
entrepreneurs invest only a low level of e⁄ort, an individual entrepreneur will receive a
high social prestige if she is observed to be investing a high level of e⁄ort. We denote this
e⁄ect in the following as the benchmark e⁄ect of e(w)
￿. The larger the average e⁄ort in a
5group, the smaller the social prestige the observed entrepreneur will receive for her e⁄ort.
Also in the group loan case, the invested e⁄ort reduces the expected utility by ￿e(w).
Utility given consumption c, prestige q and e⁄ort ￿ is u = v (c;q;￿). Only consumption









specify v = u(c) + x(q;￿) such that we ￿nd the expected utility of an entrepreneur in a
group is given by





















G ￿ ￿(e(w)). (8)
Looking at the banks, we assume the bank to make zero pro￿ts. Of course competitive
markets with perfect information are far from reality in developing countries. Neverthe-
less, we use these assumptions in the model to show the mechanism. The bank collects
capital, lends money and charges interest rates. The bank demands 1+rI from individual
borrowers and 1 + rG from borrowers in groups. If the project is successful, the bank
receives the complete repayment including interest. If the project fails, the bank receives
nothing in the individual case and likewise nothing in the group case.
The insurer collects f from every borrower in the group. At the end of the period she
provides an insurance payment of ￿(e(w)) to every borrower in the group who fails. The
insurance payment is dependent on the amount of e⁄ort the entrepreneur invests in the
project. The more e⁄ort the entrepreneur invests, the higher the insurance payment will
be. However, we have ￿(e(w)) < y ￿ (1 + r)(k + f ￿ w) to avoid free riding in a group.
2.2 Optimization of the entrepreneur
In order to calculate an entrepreneur￿ s optimal level of e⁄ort, we have to consider two
steps. For the ￿rst step, she has to choose which kind of loan she wants to use. In the
second step, the entrepreneur maximizes her utility and ￿nds the optimal level of e⁄ort. In
our calculations we have to solve this problem backwards. First we calculate the optimal
e⁄ort for both loan types. We then compare them in a second step. Then we obtain the
entrepreneur￿ s decision by choosing the maximizing type of loan.
The individual entrepreneur maximizes her expected utility given in equation (1) with
respect to her individual level of e⁄ort e. We bear in mind that the level of e⁄ort is di⁄erent
for each individual level of wealth. We henceforth denote e⁄ort by e only, instead of e(wi).









6On the left-hand side of the equation (9) we have the marginal utility, which equals the
marginal costs on the right-hand side. If the marginal costs for investing e⁄ort into a
project are close to zero, the entrepreneur maximizes her e⁄ort as this maximizes her
utility.
An entrepreneur in a group maximizes equation (6) with respect to eG. She has to
take the externality, e(w)
￿, as a given. As we assume there to be many borrowers in
groups, the single contribution of one entrepreneur to the externality is too small to have
































On the left-hand side of equation (10) we have the marginal utility. On the right-hand
side we see the marginal costs and the marginal e⁄ect from the social prestige function.
As we are faced with a di⁄erential equation, analytical solutions are not easy to interpret
anymore. For this reason we shift the explanation of the insights concerning this equation
to the numerical part of the paper.
Considering all of the factors together, we have a decision for individual loan if the
expected utility from an individual loan is larger than the expected utility of a group loan,
such that E (uI) ￿ E (uG).
2.3 Optimization of the banks
Banks collect capital from creditors and allocate it to the borrowers. We assume that the
bank is realizing zero pro￿ts for every single entrepreneur it gives a loan to, regardless
of whether the entrepreneur is part of a group or whether the entrepreneur borrows own
her own3. For each individual loan the bank re￿nances the amount of capital k ￿w from
the capital market price s. The bank transfers this capital to the individual entrepreneur.
If the project succeeds, the bank receives the repayment of the capital including the
interest rate (k ￿ w)(1 + rI). If the project fails, the bank receives nothing. At the end
of the investment period, the bank has to repay the collected capital including interests,
(k￿w)(1 + s), to the creditor. Thus, the bank is faced with the following expected pro￿t
from an individual loan
E￿BI = p(eI)(1 + rI)(k ￿ w) ￿ (1 + s)(k ￿ w) = 0. (11)
3We do not look at cross subsidization at this point. If it were possible to make pro￿t with one kind
of loan or another, other banks would enter into the market and raise competition to the level of zero
pro￿ts. So in the long run, cross subsidization in impossible. Nevertheless, it could be pro￿table in the
short run.
7Rewriting equation (11) gives the interest rate requested by the bank depending on the
e⁄ort by the individual borrower,
(1 + rI)p(eI) = 1 + s. (12)
In equation (12) we see the bank￿ s expected pro￿t on the left-side and the costs on the
right-hand side. Given a probability function where 0 ￿ p(eI) ￿ 1, a bank will demand
an interest rate that lies between an in￿nitely high interest rate and the capital market
rate s.
For every loan given to an entrepreneur in a group, the bank re￿nances the amount
k + f ￿ w from the capital market. This capital is transferred to the borrower. The
bank receives a repayment including capital and interests, (k + f ￿ w)(1 + rG), if the
entrepreneur￿ s project is successful. If the project fails however, the bank receives nothing.
At the end of the investment period, the bank has to repay the lent capital, including
the interest rate, (k + f ￿ w)(1 + s), to its creditors. This gives a bank the following
expected pro￿t from a group loan
E￿BG = p(eG)(1 + rG)(k + f ￿ w) ￿ (1 + s)(k + f ￿ w) = 0. (13)
Rewriting gives
(1 + rG)p(eG) = 1 + s. (14)
The only di⁄erence between an individual loan and a group loan for a bank is given by
a possible higher amount of loan in the group case and a di⁄erent, but for the bank
exogenously given, level of e⁄ort by the entrepreneur. The bank receives no additional
payment if the project fails for a group loan4. For all of these calculations we assume
complete information and perfect foresight. When calculating an interest rate, the bank
knows the level of e⁄ort that an entrepreneur will invest.
2.4 Optimization of the insurer
It is also important to know how high the fee for joining a group will be. As the fee is
directly linked to the payment if the project fails we consider these two features together.
The payment in the case where the project fails depends on the level of e⁄ort invested
by an entrepreneur. This mechanism should illustrate the mutual liability in a loan
group. The payment is not made to a bank, it remains with the borrower. We model
this mechanism as an insurance mechanism in order to make it easier to consider this
mutual liability. We therefore will denote the person who handles the mutual liability as
the ￿insurer￿ . She is assumed to be fair. This means that she will not make any pro￿t.
Thus, we have a fair insurance mechanism. The insurer receives the fee, f, from every
4We exclude this often used mechanism because we would like to show an unbiased comparison of both
types of loan. With this mechanism, we avoid banks having a preference towards groups by demanding
lower interest rates than in the individual case.
8entrepreneur joining a group at the beginning of the investment period. She invests the
money in a safe project with return s. At the end of the investment period, she receives
(1 + s)f from the safe project and has to pay ￿(e) to the failing borrower. The project
failing has the probability 1 ￿ p(e). This gives the following condition for the insurance
mechanism
E￿FP = (1 + s)f ￿ (1 ￿ p(eG))￿(eG) = 0. (15)
Rewriting gives the optimal fee, f, as
(1 + s)f = (1 ￿ p(eG))￿(eG). (16)
On the left-hand side of equation (16), we see the marginal return of the insurance and
on the right-hand side the expected payments, the marginal costs. Here we have to make
the necessary assumption that there are enough entrepreneurs in groups paying the fee,
f, so that every failing borrower can receive her insurance payment ￿(e). Considering
this group of only four or ￿ve people and one insurer per group would not be enough. In
a case like this, the probability of the insurer ￿running out of money￿is very high. So we
could assume that the insurer is responsible for all the groups in one village or even for
all groups in several other villages to make sure the payment in case the project fails will
be secure. However, by the law of large numbers, we can assume equation (16) to hold.
3 Social prestige and the critical threshold of wealth
3.1 The decentralized allocation
In the individual case, we use equation (9) and equation (12) to determine the equilibrium.
Equation (9) gives the optimal level of e⁄ort for an entrepreneur depending on a given
level of interest rate. Equation (12) de￿nes the level of interest rate given a level of e⁄ort.












I ￿ y ￿
1 + s
p(eI)
(k ￿ w). (18)
We see with an increasing outcome y and an increasing level of wealth, the optimal level
of e⁄ort increases, ceterus paribus. If interest rate r or the amount of loan k increase, the
level of e⁄ort is decreases, ceterus paribus. Di⁄erent levels of optimal e⁄ort result from
di⁄erent levels of individual wealth. Each entrepreneur has an individual optimal level of
e⁄ort and is therefore faced with an individual interest rate.
When we consider a borrower in a group we take equation (10) and replace 1 + r by












































for the optimal equilibrium level of e⁄ort. As we are now handling a di⁄erential equation,
a simple analysis similar to the individual case is not straightforward. For this reason we
will delay this until the numerical section.
The decision to switch from group lending to individual lending is made if the expected
utility from an individual loan is equal to or higher than the expected utility from a group






















3.2 The planner allocation
The central planner is looking for an optimal allocation that maximizes the welfare of
the society. We assume a market where individual and group loans exist side-by-side.
Here we denote the critical level of wealth as w￿. In the optimal allocation, we have to
assume a distribution of wealth, as the planner is maximizing the welfare function of the
economy. For now, we limit our calculation to borrowers with 0 ￿ w ￿ wmax. For this, we
use a truncated normal distribution of wealth. The truncated normal distribution is the
probability distribution of a normally distributed random variable whose value is either
bounded below and/or above. We have
h(w) =
f(w)
F (wmax) ￿ F (0)
. (23)
We denote the density at a speci￿c level of wealth w with h(w). The welfare of the
economy can be described as the integral of the expected utilities from all entrepreneurs
that choose a group loan, w ￿ w￿, plus the integral of the expected utilities from all








10The second part of equation (24) denotes the expected utility of an individual loan
in the economy. Deriving equation (24) with respect to eI for an individual entrepreneur






= ￿, which is exactly the same expression as in
equation (17). Thus the optimal level of e⁄ort for an individual loan is identical to the
decentralized model.
The expected utility of entrepreneurs in a group is given in the ￿rst part of equation
(24). For the planner, the externality e(w)
￿ is not exogenous, so that the expected utility
for a borrower in a group is given as


















G ￿ y ￿ (1 + r)(k + f ￿ w), cbad





. Maximizing equation (24) for a borrower in a group,






































which di⁄ers from equation (19) due to the additional part in the derivation of the social
prestige function.
To quantify the di⁄erence of the optimal allocation compared to the decentralized
maximization, we have to compare the derivations of the social prestige functions. In the
decentralized allocation, we derive only the ￿rst part of the social prestige function as
the externality is exogenous for the entrepreneur. In the optimal allocation, the planner
derives the complete social prestige function as the externality is endogenous for him.












If we assume the externality to be negative with equation (5), we see the second part on
the right-hand side of equation (27) will be smaller than zero for ￿ > 0. So, we ￿nd that
the ￿rst derivative of the social prestige function in the optimal allocation is smaller than
in the decentralized allocation for all ￿ > 0. Given this information, we can conclude
that the right-hand side of equation (26) will always be larger than the right-hand side
of equation (19). Therefore, we know that the optimal level of e⁄ort for a borrower in a
group in the maximization of a central planner is always smaller than in the decentralized
allocation. There is too much e⁄ort in the decentralized equilibrium for all wealth levels.
11The phenomenon is called the ￿rat-race￿equilibrium ￿rst shown by Akerlof (1976) and
veri￿ed empirically by Landers et al. (1996). Adverse selection can lead to overwork in
the economy (Landers et al., 1996) as we can also observe in our model.
3.3 E⁄ects of the externality
Now we consider how the externality a⁄ects the critical level of wealth at which an en-
trepreneur would decide to leave group lending and borrow individually. With this con-
sideration, we are able to study whether an entrepreneur should switch her loan type in
general or not. If yes, we can further analyze whether the decentralized level for switching
for wealth e w is lower or higher than the level for switching for wealth w￿ in the optimal
allocation. Knowing this allows us to understand the fundamental question posed in the
title: Is there too much group lending?
The critical e w in the decentralized setup is determined by equation (21). To calculate
this level, we have to use the ￿rst order conditions from the optimization part which
determine the optimal levels of e⁄ort in the group case and in the individual case, i.e.
equation (19) and equation (17). Furthermore, we have to apply the externality equation
(3) and the equilibrium consumption in the group and in the individual case, equation
(20) and equation (18). For a summary presentation of all equations, see appendix A. In
order to examine the e⁄ect of the externality on e w, we take the system of equations, note
that e w = e w(￿), and release the relation @ e w=@￿ numerically. The critical level of wealth
in the optimal allocation w￿ is determined by the system of equations shown in appendix
B. The equations are similar to the equations explained above, with the exception of
equation (19). Equation (19) will be replaced by the combination of equation (26) and
equation (27) as the externality is endogenous for the central planner. Also, here the
switching level of wealth is a function of ￿. Thus, we consider the e⁄ect of the externality
by releasing @w￿=@￿ numerically.
We start the analysis at a common value of ￿ at which the critical levels in the
decentralized case and the optimal allocation are equal, e w = w￿. We can then use @ e w=@￿
and @w￿=@￿ to study whether the entrepreneurs switch too soon, @ e w=@￿ < @w￿=@￿, or
too late, @ e w=@￿ > @w￿=@￿, for a welfare maximizing equilibrium.
4 Qualifying the excessive use of group loans
In order to obtain quantitative results, we solve the decentralized and planner allocation





12a concave probability function as
p(e) = 1 ￿ exp(￿￿e) (29)
where p0 (e) = ￿ exp(￿￿e), a function for the failure payment in a group
￿(eG) = cmin + deG (30)
where cmin;d > 0;￿(0) = 0; and ￿(eG) > 0, a social prestige function





where a;b;> 0, and " > 0, and the following parameters
variable value
slope of probability function, p0 (0) ￿ = 0:3
outcome y = 500
capital market interest rate s = 0:06
amount of loan k = 100
cost of e⁄ect of e ￿ = 1
social penalty for e = 0 a = 1
social bene￿t for e > 0 b = 0:11
externality parameter ￿ = 1:1
parameter in social prestige for e > 0 " = 0:15
parameter for risk aversion ￿ = 0:9
minimum insurance payment cmin = 0:5
bene￿t in insurance for e > 0 d = 0:5.
Table 1 Starting parameters for the numerical solution
4.1 The decentralized allocation
For the calculation of the optimal e⁄ort in the individual loan case, we use the probability
function in the form p(eI) = 1 ￿ exp(￿￿eI). We take equation (9) and rewrite it with
respect to 1 + rI. We then make use of the probability function, equation (29), and the
utility function given in equation (28) to get










13Assuming p0 (0) = ￿ and p0 (1) = 0, we look at equation (9) at eI = 0 to obtain the
maximum interest rate an entrepreneur is willing to pay as










Afterwards, we look at the bank￿ s interest rate equation (12) and replace the expression
p(eI) with the probability function to get




So we have two equations that determine 1+rI. Equation (32) gives the view of interest
rates for the entrepreneur and equation (34) shows the bank￿ s calculation. The equilibrium
interest rate and optimal level of e⁄ort are given by combining these two functions. We
illustrate these equilibrium levels of e⁄ort for the individual case in ￿gure 1.
































Figure 1 Intersections of optimal interest rates in the individual case
The blue line is the bank￿ s equilibrium interest rate depending on the e⁄ort invested
in the project. The dashed lines are the optimal interest rates from the borrower￿ s view.
The lowest line is measured with no wealth and the lines above are measured with wealth
at w = 20;50;70;80;90. For each level of wealth, we ￿nd two equilibrium interest rates.
The intersections on the right are the optimal ones as the utility is higher for each level
of wealth.
If we solve for a group loan, we use the probability function in the form p(eG) =
1￿exp(￿￿eG). To obtain the equilibrium, we look at equation (10). We rewrite equation
(10) with respect of 1+rG and use equation (28), equation (29), and equation (30). Thus,
we get






￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + (cmin + deG)
1￿￿ ￿i 1
1￿￿
k + f ￿ w
(35)
14where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ exp(￿￿eG)))(cmin + deG)
￿￿ d, ￿ ￿ b(1 + ")e"
Ge￿￿(1+") and the fee
for the group as
f =
(1 ￿ (1 ￿ exp(￿￿eG)))(cmin + deG)
1 + s
. (36)
We use the probability function in equation (14) to consider the bank￿ s view on interest
rates for group loans and get




Again, we obtain two equations that de￿ne 1+ rG. Combining these two equations gives
the equilibrium interest rate and optimal e⁄ort for a borrower in a group. The illustration
of the intersections in the group case is illustrated in ￿gure 2. As before, the blue line
shows the optimal interest rate seen by a bank and the dashed lines for the borrower.
Here the intersections on the right are also utility maximizing.
































Figure 2 Intersections of optimal interest rates in the group case with externality
As the next step, we can calculate the expected utility an individual entrepreneur is








We take equation (12) and include the utility, equation (28) and the probability, equation



























￿) ￿ ￿eG. (40)
15By using equation (14) and equation (28), equation (29), equation (30), equation (31)


























with the fee for joining a group, f, given in equation (36). Now we can observe the level of
wealth e w for switching in the decentralized case at EuI = EuG. Given this level, we solve
for all other variables. The description of the methods used for the numerical solution is
given in appendix D.
4.2 The planner allocation
The planner allocation is given in equation (24). The numerical solution for the individual
borrower remains the same as in the decentralized case as the externality only e⁄ects the
borrowers in groups. As the externality is endogenous for the planner, we consider a
changing equation (35) as ￿ becomes
￿ ￿ b(1 + ")e
"
Ge







In the planner optimization, we have an additional part in equation (42) which accounts
for the endogeneity of the externality. The comparison of the expected utilities changes
as we use equation (42) in equation (35). All other equations remain the same.
5 Stigma makes them switch, (but) too soon
We structure our consideration in two parts. First, we control in general whether a switch
to individual lending is utility maximizing. Further on, we study if the switching point in
the decentralized solution is optimal compared to the planner solution. For this we have
to look at the solution in two cases. Initially, we assume no externality as a benchmark
and then extend the consideration to a negative externality.
5.1 Model without an externality
In a model without externality, i.e. ￿ = 0, we ￿nd individual lending is always utility
maximizing, i.e. e w = w￿ = 0. Entrepreneurs should not switch to group lending. They
should choose an individual loan right from the beginning. Looking at this situation in
16welfare terms, we ￿nd no di⁄erence in the decentralized and optimal allocation as the
second part of the right-hand side of equation (27) becomes zero. Equation (26) therefore
becomes identical to equation (19). Thus for ￿ = 0, we know e w = w￿. The analytical
proof is given in appendix C.
5.2 Model with a negative externality
Introducing a negative externality, i.e. ￿ > 1, we talk about stigma in a group. We now
￿nd that borrowers should start with group lending and switch to individual lending at
the speci￿c levels e w, respectively w￿, in order to maximize their utility. Both levels are
lower than the maximum level of wealth wmax for every ￿ > 1. If we compare in terms
of welfare, we ￿nd that entrepreneurs do switch to individual lending, but they do so too
early when compared with the planner￿ s optimal allocation as shown in ￿gure 3.























critical levels of wealth
decentralized allocation
planner allocation
Figure 3 Critical values of wealth in the decentralized and planner allocation
The straight line shows the critical level of wealth to switch, w￿, in the planner alloca-
tion and the dashed line the critical level of wealth, e w, in the decentralized allocation. We
￿nd e w is always higher than w￿. We therefore ￿nd here an application of the ￿rat-race￿
equilibrium as described by Akerlof (1976). Borrowers are investing too much e⁄ort into
the decentralized case in equilibrium as shown in ￿gure 4.
















Effort in a group
decentralized allocation
planner allocation
Figure 4 E⁄ort invested in a group loan
They leave the group too early in order to avoid social pressure and time wasting. If
we look at the mechanism more closely, we ￿nd two key factors driving the results. On
the one hand, we have the insurance that makes group participation attractive, see ￿gure
5.




























Insurance payment weighted by failure probability
decentralized allocation
planner allocation
Figure 5 Insurance payment weighted by the probability of failure for a borrower in a
group
For the decentralized case, we have a slightly falling curve for the planner allocation
as the insurance payment is clearly increasing for a stronger externality, i.e. an increasing
￿. As the insurance function, ￿(eG) = cmin + deG weighted by 1 ￿ p(eG), is strongly
dependent on the level of e⁄ort, we can see an explanation for the very small change for
the decentralized case when compared to the planner allocation as e⁄ort changes much
more in the latter case, see ￿gure 4. On the other hand, the borrowers in a group are
faced with the social prestige function, given by q (eG) = ￿a+b(eG=e￿)
1+". A illustration
of the social prestige functions is shown in ￿gure 6.


















































Figure 6 Social prestige function
In the decentralized case, the value of the social prestige function is negative and
slightly increasing. In the planner allocation the function is u-shaped and also negative.
The stronger the externality becomes, the lower the level of e⁄ort needed to increase her
social prestige. The joint e⁄ect of insurance and social prestige function is illustrated in
￿gure 7.























Joint effect of insurance and social prestige
surplus decentralized
surplus planner
Figure 7 Joint e⁄ect of insurance and social prestige function in a loan group
This could be explained by the increasing insurance payment, if the externality be-
comes stronger. The weighted insurance payment increases as the probability of failure
increases as the level of e⁄ort decreases. The level of e⁄ort needed to increase her social
prestige is not as high in a strong externality environment as when the externality is weak.
At low levels of ￿, the surplus in the decentralized solution is higher. However, given the
excessive e⁄ort, the expected utility is smaller than in the planner case as investing e⁄ort
produces costs. We illustrate the optimality of the planner allocation by comparing the
expected utilities in ￿gure 8.
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Figure 8 Expected utility in a group
The expected utility for the planner allocation is larger than the decentralized utility
for all ￿ > 1.
For that we have two results to be named. We show that with a negative externality,
a switch in loan types from group lending to individual lending should take place in order
to maximize utility. Furthermore, we ￿nd entrepreneurs are switching too late in terms
of wealth when compared to the optimal level of wealth for switching, i.e. e w < w￿.
6 Concluding comments
We study whether individual lending can ￿t the needs and wants of borrowers in mi-
cro￿nance better than group lending. In order to do so, we enriched standard economic
analysis by a social component, the social prestige function with an externality. We de-
velop a model where individual and group loans coexist in the market. When compared
to individual lending group lending consist of three additional mechanisms: the fee for
joining a group, a payment in case her project fails and the social prestige function. The
entrepreneur could invest in two projects, in each case either individually or as a part of a
group. We consider the investments in risky projects and compare the resulting expected
utilities to resolve the optimal lending strategy for an entrepreneur.
We looked at the model with no externality and with a negative externality. In general,
we ￿nd that there is too much group lending in micro￿nance. If we have no externality,
borrowers should borrow individually only. If we have a negative externality, entrepreneurs
should start with group lending if they are very poor. Entrepreneurs that have more than
a critical level of wealth should borrow individually. As the externality becomes stronger,
the threshold for switching credit type increases.
Furthermore, we look at the model in welfare terms. Here we ￿nd an evidence for
the ￿rat-race￿equilibrium as described by Akerlof (1976). With a negative externality,
borrowers are investing too much e⁄ort in their projects in the decentralized allocation
and would therefore switch to individual lending too early when compared to the central
20planner￿ s optimal allocation. Nevertheless, a change of credit type is also optimal in the
planner allocation at a speci￿c threshold of wealth and above.
With this new view on group lending, we provide an initial theoretical explanation
for the gradual replacement of group loans by individual loans in micro￿nance as we
see it in developing countries today. We would suggest to support individual lending in
development policy as opposed to group lending in order to increase borrower￿ s expected
utility and the welfare of the economy as a whole.
However, this work needs to be developed further. So, we would like to analyze
the model in a dynamic framework to illustrate a possible accumulation of wealth and
the impacts of such a possibility. Furthermore, one can introduce monopolistic power
of banks into the market to consider which changes an increasing interest rate would
cause for individual utility and welfare of the economy. The consideration of a positive
externality could also give more insight to the model.
A The system of equations for the decentralized equi-
librium value of e w
In order to determine the level of wealth for switching from group lending to individual
lending, we have the following system of equation with six unknown variables.
(I) The level of wealth, e w, for switching is determined at the intersection of the expected
utility from the group loan with the expected utility from the individual loan as
p(eG)u(b c
good



































































I ￿ y ￿
1 + s
p(eI)
(k ￿ e w), (47)
and















B The system of equations for the optimal equilib-
rium value of w￿
Equilibrium conditions for the social optimum are replicated here for completeness sake.
However, it is worth pointing out that only equation (51) di⁄ers from the corresponding
equation (45) in the decentralized equilibrium.
(I) The level of wealth, w￿, for switching is determined bythe point at which the expected
utility of the group loan is equal to the expected utility for the individual loan as
p(eG)u(b c
good





























































































C The model without an externality
Let us assume that ￿ = 0. We have no externality in the model. If we look at the







for all i and therewith













The derivation of the social prestige function equation (27) becomes






















jext=1 = 0. (60)
All equations in appendix A are thereby identical to the equations in appendix B for
￿ = 0. The maximization of both problem sets would lead to an identical allocation,
which is optimal. Thus, we know that for ￿ = 0, the critical levels for switching from
group lending to individual lending will be identical, i.e. e w = w￿.
23D Numerical solution
We use Matlab for the numerical solution to solve the equilibrium given in appendix A
and appendix B. We are faced with a multiple ￿xed-point problem as the true value of the
externality and the value of the critical level of wealth must be assumed in the beginning,
while they are determined during computing. Thus, we apply bisection routines for both
hypothetical values to ￿nd the true value during computation.
We start by using the hypothetical values for the calculation of the optimal level
of e⁄ort for an individual and for a group loan with fzero routine. For every function,
individual and group lending, we get two values of optimal e⁄ort. The ￿rst at the lower
intersection and the second at the utility maximizing larger intersection. In order to ￿nd
these values, we have to split the function into two di⁄erent sections as the fzero routine
demands di⁄erent signs to ￿nd a solution. We therefore need three marginal values. One
very low, one very high and one in between. The middle frontier value is then calculated
separately for the individual and the group loan as the average of the low and high value.
We then calculate the optimal levels of e⁄ort using both hypothetical values, the one
for the externality and the one for the critical level of wealth. We use the higher level of
wealth to calculate the expected utility in both cases at the optimal level of e⁄ort, given
the hypothetical values. Then we compare these values and adjust the hypothetical value
for the critical levels of wealth e w. If the di⁄erence between the two values of wealth used
in the bisection calculation is smaller then a given precision, we assume the value to be
the true critical level of wealth. Having the true level of wealth for switching we calculate
the corresponding true externality. Here we also check whether the di⁄erence of the two
hypothetical values of the externality is smaller than a given number. If not, we continue
the bisection routine; if it is smaller we stop here. The true value of the externality is
then assumed to be the average of the last two values used in the bisection routine.
Having now found the true externality and the true level of wealth for switching, we
can solve for all other values in the model
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